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The costs of debt crises are not invariant to the foreign debt instrument composition: bank
loans or bonds. The lending boom of the 1990s witnessed considerable variation over time and
across countries in the debt instrument used by emerging market (EM) borrowers. This paper
tests how macroeconomic fundamentals affect the composition of international debt instruments
used by EM borrowers. Analysis of micro–level data using ordered probability model shows that
macroeconomic fundamentals explain a significant share of variation in the ratio of bonds to
loans for private borrowers, but not for the sovereigns.
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1 Introduction
During the lending boom of the 1990s, unlike in the past, emerging market (EM) borrowers — public
as well as private — borrowed heavily from foreign banks and also actively issued international
bonds. The decade witnessed considerable increase of borrowing on both of these markets, but also
a considerable variation over time and across countries in the ratio of these two debt instruments.1
The goal of this paper is to analyze how macroeconomic fundamentals affect this variation in the
use of foreign debt instrument, a question that has not been addressed much in the literature.2
It is important to understand what makes EM borrowers rely more on one debt instrument versus
the other because emerging markets are prone to debt crises and the costs of these crises depend
on the instrument that the country primarily relies upon. Both instruments have advantages and
disadvantages when it comes to restructuring of the debt.3 The disadvantage of bond debt has
been emphasized in the IMF proposals to reform international financial architecture:
When faced with a restructuring, individual creditors, unlike banks, have more in-
centives to hold out for the best possible terms, or to sue for better terms. Also,
disagreement over the relative treatment of different types of creditors are more likely.4
Simple statistics show that the countries with highest proportion of bonds in their external debt
stock take on average about twice as long to reschedule their debt as the countries with lower
proportion of bonds.5 It is not clear, though, whether more difficult restructuring is necessarily a
1See Data Appendix for the details and data description.
2One exception is Buch (2002) that analyzed the effects of macro variables on bilateral bond and bank loan flows
among five of the G-7 countries using a gravity model.
3See Truglia, Levey, and Mahoney (1995) for the discussion of relative costs of restructuring bonds and bank loans.




bad thing. Dooley (2000) argues that a higher cost of defaults makes it less likely that sovereigns
will choose to repudiate their debt. As a result, we should expect the debt crises to be more frequent
in countries that rely primarily on bank lending. The chance of a liquidity crisis can also be higher
in this case because loan contracts frequently carry covenants that allow banks to discontinue their
financing on relatively short notice. These covenants can also contribute to the spread of financial
“contagion,” as we have witnessed during the Asian crisis in 1997-98.
These differences should be taken into account when (re-)designing international financial archi-
tecture and, in particular, the role of international financial institutions. In an important step in
this direction, Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody (2005) find that IMF supervision is much more
important for the bond market than for bank loans, mainly due to the fact that banks themselves
engage in supervision and monitoring through repeated lending to the same borrowers.
But what makes countries rely primarily on bond market rather than bank loans for their external
funding in the first place? More specifically, what is the relationship between the composition
of external debt instruments and macroeconomic fundamentals, which are themselves a focus of
international financial institutions’ policy recommendations? This paper, by answering these ques-
tions, contributes to the debate on international financial architecture, without taking a stance in
a normative discussion of whether the bond market or the banks represent a more preferable way
to borrow.
Since the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and the debt instrument is not an
obvious one, the paper first summarizes relevant theoretical literature. The framework in Diamond
(1991) and its static version in Hale (2001) generate clear empirical implications and are therefore
used as a stepping stone for the empirical analysis.6 The main implications of the model associate
the composition of debt instruments with riskiness of the borrower.
6See a review of this and other theories in Hale and Santos (2004).
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Given that the question of this paper is the effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on the foreign
debt instrument composition, it focuses on country risk. Country risk is more relevant for the EM
borrowers than for those in the industrialized countries (Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000). For this
reason, and because the issue is much more relevant for the EM borrowers, this paper focuses on
emerging markets. Since country risk affects foreign and domestic lenders differently, the analysis
is limited to foreign borrowing. Thus, the results are only relevant to the instrument composition
of the foreign debt.
The empirical analysis utilizes micro–level data in order to control for changes in borrowers com-
position. The data set is made of individual bond issues and loan contracts. Nevertheless, this
paper does not focus on the effects of firm characteristics, due to firm data limitations and be-
cause this relationship has been explored in corporate finance literature, most recently in Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999), Denis and Mihov (2003), Hale and Santos (2004) and Krish-
naswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999).7 Data on bond issues and loan contract by EM public
and private borrowers during the 1990s are analyzed using a discrete choice model.
The analysis confirms that macroeconomic factors such as the debt service to exports ratio, the
degree of the real exchange rate appreciation, the volatility of exports, and the history of sovereign
debt rescheduling, among others, affect debt instrument composition in an expected direction.
The results also show that macroeconomic fundamentals explain a large share of variation in the
ratio of bonds to loans for private borrowers: 26% of the cross-country variation and 4% of the
time variation. The effects of macroeconomic fundamentals are also economically significant: for
example, for private borrowers Brady–type debt rescheduling in the preceding year increases the
7These studies found support for the reputation–building predictions of Diamond’s model and moral hazard, but
only limited evidence of adverse selection. They also showed that firm credit quality is an important determinant of
debt instrument, which is consistent with the findings of this paper.
4
probability of issuing a speculative grade bond (rather than taking a loan or issuing an investment
grade bond) by at least 0.16, an increase in the debt service to export ratio by one standard
deviation raises the probability of issuing a speculative grade bond by about 0.05.8
For the sovereign borrowers, macroeconomic factors do not seem to explain well the variance in the
debt instrument composition, suggesting that other effects are more important in determining the
debt instrument composition for the sovereigns. Nevertheless, some of the variables used do have
large effects: Brady–type debt rescheduling in the preceding year increases the probability of issuing
a speculative rating bond (rather than taking a loan or issuing an investment grade bond) by 0.29,
an increase in the debt service to export ratio by one standard deviation raises the probability of
issuing a speculative grade bond by about 0.07, an increase in export volatility by one standard
deviation raises the probability that a sovereign issues a speculative grade bond by about 0.06. As
expected, the effects for other public borrowers are in-between those obtained for private firms and
for the sovereigns.
This paper relates to a number of empirical studies. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovich (1996),
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001), Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000), to name just a few,
analyze EM debt–equity composition, debt maturity structure and other characteristics of capital
flows to EMs. Folkerts-Landau (1985) and Aerni and Junge (1998) describe institutional features
of international bond and loan markets. Both international bond market and the syndicated loan
market have been treated in isolation,9 however, there has been little systematic attempt to analyze
the two markets in an integrated fashion: exceptions are Kamin and Kleist (1999) and Eichengreen,
Kletzer, and Mody (2005).
8These numbers are large — they represent the change in probability which is bounded between 0 and 1.
9On the pricing of international bonds, the literature goes as far back as Edwards (1986). On pricing and
availability of international bank loans, see Eichengreen and Mody (2000a).
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The paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 briefly presents theoretical considerations that motivate
econometric approach and describes the estimation methodology. Part 3 discusses the choice of
explanatory variables, describes data sources and sample characteristics. Results and robustness
tests are presented and summarized in Part 4. Part 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
The theoretical literature on the structure of corporate debt is quite broad and it includes the
analysis of intermediated versus market debt. However, Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992) remain
the main references on the determinants of the debt instruments the firms rely upon. Diamond’s
argument is built on the asymmetric information about a firm that gives rise to both moral hazard
and adverse selection. Rajan (1992), on the other hand, focuses on the hold up problem associated
with bank lending, which arises due to a bank’s informational advantage once it initiates a rela-
tionship with a firm. This provides additional rationale for the extra cost that is associated with
bank lending that is crucial in Diamond’s model. While Diamond refers to this additional cost as
a cost of monitoring, the interpretation can easily be extended to include a hold-up cost. In this
sense the two models are complementary.
There are, of course, other models that add to our understanding of differences between bank
and bond lending. In particular, Bolton and Freixas (2000) consider equity as well as bonds and
bank loans and base their analysis on the asymmetric information and relative seniority of different
instruments. They show, among other things, that if the supply of loans is large, equity will
disappear and high–risk firms will borrow from banks while low–risk firms will issue bonds. This
result is consistent with a special case of a Diamond’s model, when moral hazard is absent. This
model, as well as other theories are reviewed in some detail in Hale and Santos (2004).
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For the purpose of analyzing EM foreign debt, Diamond’s model seems most appropriate for three
reasons. First, moral hazard and adverse selection associated with asymmetric information are
pervasive both for sovereign debt and for lending to large EM firms. Second, while portfolio equity
flows to EM firms became much more important recently, in the beginning of the 1990s they were
still quite scarce. And, obviously, equity is not relevant for sovereigns’ financing decisions. Finally,
relative seniority of bonds and bank loans on international capital markets is not always specified
de jure and varies on a case by case basis.
It is important to point out that all these theories assume that a borrower is choosing a debt
instrument in a way that is minimizing the cost of funds. As such, these theories might not be
applicable to sovereign borrowers that may have additional objectives when choosing debt instru-
ment.10 Therefore, we should not necessarily expect the model to work for the sovereigns. The
test presented later in the paper will show that, indeed, the model predictions are not supported
by the data in the case of the sovereigns.11
2.1 Intuitive model description
Diamond (1991) presents a dynamic model in which monitoring and loan cancellations, but not
renegotiations are allowed. In the model there are three types of borrowers: safe, risky, and those
subject to moral hazard. These types are not observed by lenders, however lenders know the share
of each type in the borrowers’ population. The borrowers that are subject to moral hazard choose
between a safe and a risky project, while lenders choose whether to monitor the borrowers. When
10Sovereigns may have political reasons to disperse their debt among many borrowers, they also might have to
follow suggestions from international financial institutions. As Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004) show, risk
and maturity may also be important.
11While the assumption that a sovereign’s only objective is to minimize their borrowing cost might be acceptable
in a variety of settings, it does not seem to be most appropriate when analyzing the choice between bonds and loans.
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the lender chooses not to monitor the borrower, the borrower prefers to issue a bond, instead of
paying banking fees.12
Lenders’ decision to monitor or not depends on the probability that they are facing each type
of borrowers and on the action the ”switching” type would choose. Thus, the instrument that
borrower ends up with depends on the distribution of types in the population the borrower is
coming from, which can be thought of as a borrower’s expected creditworthiness. In particular, as
creditworthiness improves, borrowers are likely to switch from speculative grade bonds (represented
by the case with no monitoring and the choice of a risky project in Diamond’s model) to bank loans.
As creditworthiness improves further, borrowers switch back to the bond market, this time issuing
investment grade bonds, reflecting the now lower level of risk.13 This cost is determined by the
risk level of the borrower and in turn determines which instrument is cheaper for a given risk level.
The borrower is then assumed to choose a cheaper instrument. Thus, equation (1) represents the
equilibrium outcome regarding the debt instrument that a borrower with rating ρ will end up using.
Note that the structure of the model is such that no borrower can choose between investment grade
bond and speculative grade bond. The risk level determines the instrument that the borrower will
use — for lower risk borrowers the choice is between investment grade bonds and bank loans, while
for higher risk borrowers the choice is between speculative grade bonds and bank loans.
The intuition behind this result is that endogenous reputation works as an enforcement mechanism
12While Rodrik and Velasco (2000), Jeanne (2000), Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004) argue that in practice
bond holders can also monitor the borrower and punish those that misbehave by refusing to purchase new issues, this
is only relevant for short–term bonds. In our sample, median maturity of the bonds is 5 years.
13The cost of debt does not enter this reduced form relationship directly, but is implicit in it. In the estimation, the
spreads are not included mainly due to the fact that they are never observed for the alternative that is not chosen.
In addition, they are not available for a majority of observations and not directly comparable between bonds, that
are mainly fixed rate, and loans, that are predominantly floating rate.
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for low risk borrowers, since they are very interested in preserving this good reputation, which
eliminates the need for monitoring. At the other extreme, borrowers whose reputation is already
very poor face very low reputation costs and even monitoring will not help them overcome the moral
hazard. The borrowers with moderate risk level, however, benefit from the incentives imposed by
bank monitoring due to some probability that they can be “caught” undertaking risky projects.
The static version of the model presented in Hale (2001) shows that even without differentiated
reputation costs, the above result holds as long as we assume there are adverse selection, moral
hazard and a fee for banking intermediation (monitoring cost in Diamond’s framework or hold-up
cost in Rajan’s). This model assumes exogenous costs of default and loan cancellation that are
the same for all borrowers and are not necessarily linked to reputation, but have to be positive to
sustain borrowing. In this model as well, the main prediction (which will be used in the empirical
analysis that follows) is that the most risky and the least risky borrowers issue bonds while the
moderately risky borrowers rely on bank lending.
An alternative intuition for this result lies in the different characteristics of bonds and bank loans.
Banks can refuse to roll–over the loans, which represents a credible threat to a borrower and
therefore makes monitoring efficient.14 In contrast, after the launch of an international bond,
bondholders have little control over the issuer’s actions, since a bond issue cannot be reversed
before it matures (bond maturity was on average 5 years for EM bonds in the 1990s). These facts
suggest that banks can limit the risk of their loans and, hence, offer funds at a lower rate.
However, these advantages come at a cost. Banks bear costs not borne by bond holders, including
reserve and capital requirements, as well as operating and monitoring costs, that they pass through
to their borrowers. Hence, borrowers face a trade–off between the lower risk premium and additional
costs of bank loans as compared to bonds.
14Most loan contracts considered in the empirical analysis provide for bi–annual loan roll–over.
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This trade–off is resolved differently for different borrowers. At the low end of the risk spectrum,
borrowers do not need to be monitored. For these borrowers, the costs of financial intermediation
outweigh its benefits and they choose to use the bond market, which is able to provide funds at a
lower cost than banks. For moderate–risk borrowers, monitoring can be efficient in reducing the
risk of a loan. The costs of financial intermediation are then outweighed by the reduction in the risk
premium, which makes bank loans cheaper than bonds. For high risk borrowers, adverse selection
is important: If the bank cannot significantly reduce the risk of a loan, as will be the case with
the most risky borrowers, it will charge higher rates than the bond market, due to its additional
costs. In a situation of asymmetric information, interest rates become too high for the low–risk
borrowers, and the market disappears due to adverse selection à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Critically, because of the additional costs of banking activity, the market for bank loans disappears
at a lower risk level than does the bond market. In other words, safe projects get priced out of the
loan market for a larger set of cases then they get priced out of the bond market. As a result, we
expect the most and the least risky borrowers to issue bonds, while those of the moderate riskiness
rely primarily on bank loans. The most risky borrowers issuing bonds will pay high risk premium,
therefore it is natural to think about these bonds as high–yield speculative grade bonds.
2.2 Testable implications
The relationship between the risk level and the debt instrument described above is illustrated in
Figure 1.15
15This figure and the discussion that follows do not take into account the prediction that most risky borrowers
will not be able to borrow at all. Since no information about those that applied for a loan and did not receive it or
failed to issue a bond is available, it is not possible to take them into account. Even if it would be possible to include
observations on those that did not borrow — which is easy to do for sovereigns, one would have to separate those who











Figure 1: Risk and debt instrument






IG bond if ρ < ρ1
Bank loan if ρ1 ≤ ρ < ρ2
SG bond if ρ2 ≤ ρ
(1)
where ρ is a risk level as perceived by the lenders and ρ1, ρ2 are relevant threshold values that can
be estimated.
Clearly, the risk level of the borrower cannot be perfectly observed. However, we can observe the
variables that might affect the risk level of a borrower, and can therefore represent the above model
as an ordered probability model with unknown threshold values and latent variable ρ, which can
be estimated by maximum likelihood. The variables used to estimate risk level and the details of
estimation procedure are described below.
2.3 Estimation methodology
As described above, the model’s predictions can be represented by an ordered probability model
with unknown thresholds, where a dependant variable is an indicator of the instrument used by
the borrower in each particular case, equation (1). In this set–up ρ can be interpreted as a latent
variable that depends on a linear combination of explanatory and control variables described in a
Thus, the results should be interpreted as conditional on borrowing overseas. Additional tests were conducted in Hale
(2001) to account for the possible selection bias using data aggregation and panel tobit estimation. The results are
qualitatively the same, while estimation is computationally demanding which prevents from conducting all necessary
robustness tests.
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next section. Specifically, for country i in quarter t, observation n,





where, Y is a matrix of global variables, X is a matrix of country–specific variables, and Z is a
matrix of bond/loan specific variables. ε is assumed to be i.i.d. across observations and is usually
assumed to be drawn from either normal or logistic distribution.16
The log likelihood function for each observation in this model is
Litn = 1(y = IG bond)[log F (ρ1 − (Y ′t γ + X ′itβ + Z ′itnν))]
+ 1(y = Bank loan)[log (F (ρ2 − (Y ′t γ + X ′itβ + Z ′itnν))− F (ρ1 − (Y ′t γ + X ′itβ + Z ′itnν)))]
+ (1− 1(y = IG bond)− 1(y = Bank loan))[log(1− F (ρ2 − (Y ′t γ + X ′itβ + Z ′itnν)))].
Since some countries were much more active on the international debt market than others, the
data set has different numbers of observations for different countries in different quarters. Thus,
in estimation, the countries that borrowed heavily will disproportionately affect the results of
estimation. To balance the regression and allow for comparison across samples, importance weights
are assigned to each observation in such a way that each country in each quarter has the same
importance in the estimation, separately for each ownership sector (private, public or sovereign).17
Moulton (1990) showed that using aggregate data to explain micro–level variables can bias standard
errors downward. To control for this effect, robust standard errors clustered by country and quarter
were calculated.
16Note that a constant is not included in the equation, as it cannot be identified separately from thresholds. See,
for example Ruud (2000), page 759.
17For example, in the first quarter of 1992, the Argentinean private sector appeared in the data set 10 times — 7
loan contracts and 3 speculative grade bond issues. Thus, the weight attached to each of these observations is 0.1.
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3 Explanatory variables and the data
Theory predicts a relationship between default risk and the debt instrument a borrower will rely
upon. For majority of EM borrowers default risk is the only relevant one, since generally they
do not borrow in their own currency, but rather in a currency of majority of their lenders,18
which eliminates currency risk for the lenders. While majority of bonds and loan contracts are
denominated in US dollars, some are denominated in other currencies. Therefore, a set of dummy
variables to control for possible effects of currency denomination of bonds and loans is included in
all regressions.
In this paper the focus is on the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and the debt
composition. For sovereign borrowers, country default risk, which is affected by macroeconomic
conditions and policies, is the only relevant risk, once we abstract from the currency risk. For
private and non-sovereign public borrowers from the EMs, default risk consists of two components:
a company’s idiosyncratic risk and a country risk. It has been shown in the finance literature that
for EM firms country risk is more important than a firm’s idiosyncratic risk (Morck, Yeung, and
Yu 2000). Thus, concentrating on EM firms (rather than firms in OECD countries) allows us to
focus more squarely on the relationship between debt instrument composition and macroeconomic
fundamentals.
That said, it is still necessary to control for idiosyncratic risk. While data on individual borrowers
is limited, the composition effects of idiosyncratic risk are controlled for by including the US dollar
equivalent amount borrowed and a set of dummy variables for the broadly defined industrial sector
of a borrower, in addition to the currency denomination of the debt. An implicit assumption in
18See Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002) for a description of this phenomenon. Exceptions are Hong
Kong (which had a currency board), Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, where over half of bank loans, but not bond
issues, were denominated in local currency.
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what follows is that the rest of the idiosyncratic risk component, included in an error term, is
orthogonal to country risk and therefore, does not present an econometric problem.
According to previous studies (Eichengreen, Hale, and Mody 2001, Eichengreen and Mody 2000b,
Eichengreen and Mody 2000a, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998, Mody, Taylor, and Kim
2001), the following macroeconomic fundamentals have important effects on country default risk
(measured either as probability of financial crisis or through risk premium incorporated in sovereign
and private bond and loan spreads):
• Real economy: rate of growth of the real GDP and industrial production should both have
a negative effect on the risk level in the long run, since they improve the probability of debt
repayment for private borrowers through higher profits and for sovereigns through higher tax
revenues;
• Foreign position: the ratio of foreign debt to GDP, the ratio of debt service to exports,
the ratio of short–term to total debt, export volatility, real exchange rate appreciation, and
the current account deficit, should each have a positive effect on the risk level because they
all reflect higher vulnerability to external shocks. The ratio of foreign reserves to short–
term debt, to imports or to M2 should have a negative effect on country risk due to lower
probability of a currency crisis;
• Monetary and financial sector: the growth rate of domestic credit, the inflation rate, and the
domestic short–term real interest rate, all indicating budgetary problems and thus reducing
the probability that sovereign will be able to service the debt, should each have a positive
effect on the country risk level; while an increase in the domestic stock market index should
have a negative effect as it reflects expected improvement in fundamentals.
All of these variables can potentially affect the debt instrument composition through their effect
14
on country risk. They are all interrelated and therefore cannot be included simultaneously as
explanatory variables due to high collinearity (for example, the growth rate of real GDP can be
explained to a large extent by a combination of the other variables). Therefore, a more parsimonious
specification is adopted in what follows.19
How risky a borrower is can be measured by, inter alia, its credit rating. Individual borrowers’
credit ratings are available only for a small subset of the private borrowers and therefore, cannot be
used. Instead, each country’s credit rating from Institutional Investor is used as a proxy.20 But the
sovereign credit rating is affected by macroeconomic variables that are interesting to consider as
explanatory variables. A credit rating residual (purged of the effects of the obvious macroeconomic
variables as described in Appendix 2), and not the credit rating itself, is used as an explanatory
variable,21 in order to determine the total effect of macroeconomic variables on borrowing decisions,
and not just the direct effects for a given credit rating.
In addition, the following global variables are found in previous studies (Mody, Taylor, and Kim
(2001), among others) to affect capital flows to EMs: US GDP growth, the Emerging Market Bond
Index (EMBI), the US swap rate and the US high–yield spread (as proxies for risk aversion). Again,
19The variables are chosen to minimize collinearity and maximize interpretative power as well as maximize the
number of non–missing observations. For instance, using the ratio of current account to GDP would be informative,
but this variable is unavailable for about half of the sample and thus is omitted. Section 4.2 describes the results of
other specifications, as robustness tests.
20Institutional Investor ratings were chosen for two reasons: they have by far the best coverage for 1991-99 period,
and they provide scores on the continuous 0-100 scale at regular time intervals — twice a year. The last rating before
a bond issue or loan contract date was used.
21Institutional Investor rating is constructed by surveying investors. As such, this credit rating represents investors’
assessment of the country risk. When purged of all the effects of macroeconomic characteristics, it proxies for all
factors that matter to investor but are not observed by an econometrician. The second stage, ordered probit, standard
errors are corrected for the fact that the residual from the first stage is used.
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they cannot all be utilized in the same specification due to high degree of collinearity.
Since the data on the history of individual borrowers’ defaults is not easily available, sovereign
default data is used. A variable is constructed for each country that is equal to one if a country
had debt rescheduling in the past year, and zero otherwise. Since Brady-Type debt rescheduling
operations created a market for guaranteed bonds, as well as reduced the debt burden, they could
have a different effect than other debt rescheduling operations. Thus, separate variables for Brady–
type and non–Brady–type debt rescheduling are used.
The theory also predicts that a higher opportunity cost of lending will reduce total lending but raise
the share of bank loans. The 10-year US Treasury bond rate was used to proxy for the opportunity
cost of lending.
3.1 Data sources
The data on bond issue dates, amounts, currency denomination, ownership and industrial sector
of an issuer were gathered from Bondware. All international bonds placed internationally between
1991 and 1999 by EM borrowers were included.22 Bonds issued by firms with headquarters in
developed countries were excluded from the sample. For the bonds issued through off-shore centers,
true nationality of the borrower was traced by the location of their headquarters. The initial set
of bond issues includes 58 countries and 3757 bond issues, out of which about two thirds are by
private firms, and the rest is evenly split between sovereign issuers (central governments and central
banks) and other public borrowers (including government–owned enterprizes as well as local and
municipal authorities).23
22See Data Appendix for the list of countries and detailed data description.
23As a sensitivity analysis, local and municipal authorities were reclassified as sovereigns. This did not affect the
results.
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Since the model predicts three alternatives — investment grade bonds, bank loans, and speculative
grade bonds — while the data provide only information on bonds and loans, it is useful to split
the observed bonds into an investment grade subgroup and a speculative grade subgroup. This is
done by using individual bond ratings when available, using sovereign ratings for sovereign bonds
and also for private bonds, according to the “sovereign ceiling” practice.24 The rest of the bonds
are classified based on the predicted probability of having an investment versus speculative grade,
which is derived from fitting a probit equation for the bonds that are already classified. Due to
some missing explanatory variables in the probit regression, only 3078 bonds are classified in the
end, the rest are dropped from the sample. As a result of classification, about two thirds of the
bonds turn out to be speculative grade, and the rest are investment grade. The details of the
classification procedure, probit regression, and validity test results are presented in Appendix 3.
The data on foreign loan contract signing dates, amounts, currency denomination, ownership, and
industrial sector of a borrower were collected from Loanware. For the 1991-99 period, the data set
includes 12696 foreign banks loans, which are predominantly syndicated, extended to borrowers
in 74 developing countries.25 Just as with bonds, two thirds of the loans are extended to private
borrowers. However, the majority of remaining loans are by public borrowers, with only 429 loans
extended to sovereigns. Although this accounts for only about 3% of all loans, they are distributed
between 53 different countries, so we are still able to analyze sovereign borrowers’ debt composition.
Since each observation is a bond issue or a loan contract, the data set does not represent a panel
and is treated as a cross–section. It is combined with macroeconomic variables based on the date of
bond issue or loan contract signing. To avoid endogeneity of debt–related macroeconomic variables,
24According to this practice, private borrowers cannot obtain a rating that is better than rating of their sovereign.
Therefore, if sovereign rating is speculative, we will assume that individual firm’s bonds cannot be investment grade.
25Only about 10% are bilateral loans. Excluding those from estimation did not affect the results.
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they are included as of the period immediately preceding a given bond issue or loan contract.26
Simultaneity bias can still arise for sovereigns, since macroeconomic policies and borrowing needs
can be determined by the macroeconomic situation in the country. This possibility is taken into
account when discussing the results of the estimation and is tested for as a part of the robustness
tests.
The macroeconomic data combines variables from IMF and World Bank publications,27 credit
ratings from Institutional Investor, external debt data from the Bank for International Settlements,
and daily US interest rate series provided by the Federal Reserve Board. For some countries in
the sample, many macroeconomic variables are missing. As a result, out of the 74 countries in
the intersection of Bondware and Loanware data sets, only 58 participate in most regressions. The
variables for Brady–type and non–Brady–type debt rescheduling are constructed from the World
Bank Global Development Finance publications.
3.2 Sample characteristics
All bonds and bank loans considered in the analysis are issued as foreign debt and therefore are
offered to foreign investors, and, as a rule, are denominated in foreign currency. Table 1 summarizes
main characteristics of the data. Two thirds of the bonds bear fixed interest rate, while the bank
loans all bear floating rate. Bonds and bank loans have similar maturity distribution with a median
of 5 and 4 years respectively. This suggests that bond holders do not engage in monitoring by forcing
the borrowers to roll over their debt frequently.
Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of explanatory variables by the ownership sector
and debt instrument subsamples. Standard deviations are in parenthesis and are omitted for
26Period can be from one quarter to one year depending on data availability. Flow variables and rates are annualized.
27See Data Appendix for complete list of variables, their sources and frequencies.
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Table 1: Bond and loan characteristics
Loans Bonds IG bonds SG bonds Unclass. All observations
Observations 12696 3757 1033 2045 679 16453
Of those:
Private firms 65% 62% 33% 67% 92% 64%
Sovereigns 3.4% 18% 27% 20% 0% 7%
Public entity 32% 19% 40% 13% 8% 29%
Denom. in US $ 78% 55% 54% 72% 7% 73%
Denom. in DM/Euro 3% 9% 10% 10% 1% 5%
Denom. in Yen 2% 8% 20% 5% 2% 4%
other currency 16% 7% 10% 6% 6% 14%
Offshore issue 9% 15% 11% 15% 20% 10%
Floating rate 100% 33% 33% 33% 33% 87%
Median maturity 4 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs
Mean maturity 4.9 yrs 6.4 yrs 7.5 yrs 5.8 yrs 5.7 yrs 5.2 yrs
dummy variables. Summary statistics are computed with weights. Summary statistics for the
macroeconomic variables that were considered, but not included in the final specification are also
reported. For a given country and quarter, country variables do not vary across observations: the
differences are due to the fact that the number of each instrument issued by each sector varies from
quarter to quarter, thus, the means are different.
Investment grade bonds were mostly issued when and where the credit rating residual was high,
while speculative grade bonds were issued when and where the credit rating residual was low. We
can also see that speculative grade bonds are issued in countries and quarters with higher debt and
debt service ratios than investment grade bonds, especially by private borrowers. However, these
differences in means are not statistically significant. In most other variables differences in means
are not very prominent. Interestingly, sovereigns and other public borrowers from the countries
that rescheduled their debt in the previous year were able to issue investment grade bonds, while
private borrowers were not.
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Table 2: Means and standard deviations computed with weights
Sovereign Public Private
IG L SG IG L SG IG L SG
Credit rating 2.5 -1.0 -4.7 6.7 -0.3 -1.6 2.3 0.1 -2.3
residual (9.4) (9.7) (9.8) (8.1) (10) (8.4) (10) (11) (9.6)
Foreign debt/ 0.41 0.46 0.39 0.29 0.43 0.39 0.30 0.40 0.40
GDP (0.17) (0.24) (0.15) (0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.15) (0.27) (0.19)
Debt service/ 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.16 0.21 0.32
exports (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20)
Export growth 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
volatility (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07)
Total/Short 0.45 0.53 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.52
term debt (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13)
Real exch. rate -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -1.6 -0.1 -0.3 -1.6
depreciation (0.1) (3.2) (0.3) (0.1) (2.3) (5.0) (0.1) (2.0) (5.2)
Brady deal 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.07
Non–Brady deal 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.18
CA/GDP -7.1 -4.1 -6.1 -4.5 -7.5 -6.4 -7.6 -6.9 -4.1
(15) (15) (13) (14) (15) (11) (15) (16) (14)
Reserves/Short 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.6 2.3 2.1 1.4
term debt (3.0) (2.0) (1.7) (1.5) (2.1) (1.5) (3.1) (2.4) (1.3)
Reserves/import 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.4 1.6 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.2
(0.85) (1.2) (1.4) (0.76) (1.2) (1.3) (0.98) (1.4) (1.3)
Reserve gain in 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06
last quarter (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21) (0.18)
Growth rate of 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11
domestic credit (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.22) (0.05) (0.08) (0.20)
Log real 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.7
interest rate (0.56) (0.76) (0.71) (0.69) (0.72) (1.1) (0.76) (0.74) (1.0)
Banking system 1.6 1.1 0.86 2.6 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.4
assets/GDP (1.2) (0.94) (0.60) (1.8) (1.3) (0.96) (1.6) (1.5) (1.1)
Log inflation -2.2 -1.9 -2.1 -2.7 -2.1 -2.0 -2.6 -2.3 -1.9
rate (1.1) (1.4) (1.5) (0.9) (1.4) (2.0) (1.1) (1.4) (1.9)
US 10-year 6.4 6.5 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.4
Treasury rate (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.7) (0.9) (0.7) (0.7) (0.9) (0.7)
Maturity 8.1 6.6 6.8 7.2 5.3 5.1 6.6 4.8 5.9
(7.5) (5.2) (6.6) (7.8) (3.9) (3.9) (6.8) (3.5) (5.1)
Log amount 5.4 4.4 5.6 4.9 4.1 4.6 4.5 3.5 4.3
(0.8) (1.4) (0.8) (0.9) (1.2) (0.8) (0.9) (1.2) (0.8)
US Dollar 0.43 0.71 0.53 0.53 0.78 0.73 0.62 0.75 0.74
Deutsche Mark 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06
Euro 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01
Yen 0.25 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.01
Finance industry 0.54 0.20 0.51 0.68 0.30 0.64
Service industry 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.06
Manufacturing 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.32 0.17
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Table 3: Coefficient on credit rating in univariate regression
(1) (2) (3)
Ordered probit IG bond vs. loan SG bond vs. loan
Private sector -0.014*** 0.011** -0.14***
(0.002) (0.005) (-0.003)
Sovereign -0.033*** 0.025*** -0.20***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Public entities -0.022*** 0.031*** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Dependent variable in (1) is equal to 0 for IG bond, to 1 for bank loan and 2 for SG bond;
in (2) and (3) dependent variables are equal to 1 for a bond and 0 for a bank loan.
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Another observation is that whether the US Treasury rate is low or high does not seem to affect
the instrument debt composition — there are no systematic differences in the Treasury rate for
different instrument issuance. Finally, one can see that investment grade bonds tend to be of longer
maturity than either loan or speculative grade bonds, which is expected.
Table 3 offers simple correlations between credit rating and the debt instrument composition. These
are obtained by estimating a regression with credit rating as the only explanatory variable. The
first column represents an ordered probit regression, columns two and three represent the results
of binary probit regressions of investment grade bond versus loan and speculative grade bond
versus loan respectively. The results support the main prediction of the model — higher credit
ratings (which implies lower risk) has a correct sign in the ordered model. It also increases the
probability of an investment grade bond being issued versus a bank loan and lowers the probability
of a speculative grade bond issue versus a bank loan, as expected. These coefficients are significant
at 5% confidence level for all ownership sectors. Including Y and Z variables, as we will in the
analysis below, does not alter these results (in fact, it improves the significance and slightly raises
the magnitude of some coefficients).
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4 Empirical Results
Estimation is conducted separately for each of three ownership types: private, sovereign, and other
public borrowers, allowing for different threshold points and different coefficients on explanatory
variables for different ownership sectors. As one can see, the results for public borrowers are
generally in-between those for private firms and those for sovereigns, as one would expect. Thus,
these results are presented but are not discussed in detail. To interpret coefficients in the ordered
model, one can think of risk level being a latent variable, thus, we would expect positive coefficients
on the variables that increase risk level.
4.1 Impact of macroeconomic fundamentals
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the main specification. Since we are interested in the
effects of macroeconomic fundamentals that in turn affect credit rating, the credit rating itself
is not included, instead the credit rating residual is used as described above. Marginal effects
are computed for each outcome of the ordered probit regression and reported in Table 5. They
represent the derivative of the probability of a given outcome with respect to the explanatory
variable. They are evaluated at the mean of independent variables using the coefficients from
ordered probit regression. For binary variables, the marginal effects are the effects of the change of
the variable from 0 to 1 on the probability of a given outcome.
Most results are as expected. Note that the coefficients in the regression for the sovereign borrowers
have lower significance level. This is partly due to a smaller number of observations for the sov-
ereigns. It also suggests that the model does not do as well in explaining sovereign debt instrument
composition. This finding is confirmed below in the analysis of the predictive power of the model.
A higher credit rating residual has the expected sign in all three regressions (higher credit rating
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Table 4: Ordered probit results
Private sector Sovereign Public entities
Credit rating residual -0.014*** -0.042*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
Foreign debt/GDP -0.10 0.43 0.20
(0.33) (0.85) (0.35)
Debt service/Exports 1.68*** 1.16 1.07
(0.43) (0.94) (0.69)
Export growth volatility -0.94** 1.77* 0.92*
(0.44) (0.97) (0.50)
Short-term/Total foreign debt -0.20 0.90 -0.20
(0.35) (0.99) (0.31)
Real exchange rate depreciation -0.045*** -0.016 -0.082***
(0.007) (0.035) (0.014)
Brady-type debt rescheduling 0.67*** 0.76* 0.77**
(0.26) (0.39) (0.31)
Non-Brady type debt rescheduling 0.49*** 0.64 0.59***
(0.13) (0.40) (0.19)
US 10-year Treasury rate 0.080* -0.086 -0.084*
(0.043) (0.074) (0.047)
Log amount 0.11** 0.14* -0.055
(0.051) (0.078) (0.073)
US Dollar denominated -0.35** 0.26 0.27
(0.14) (0.21) (0.19)
Deutsche Mark/Euro denominated -0.44** 0.56** 0.02
(0.21) (0.28) (0.24)
Yen denominated -0.64** -0.20 -0.10
(0.28) (0.20) (0.24)
Finance industry 0.30** -0.000
(0.15) (0.15)
Service industry 0.19** 0.13
(0.08) (0.10)
Manufacturing industry 0.06 -0.14
(0.09) (0.09)
Actual observations 9166 857 4022
Dependent variable is equal to 0 for IG bond, to 1 for bank loan and 2 for SG bond;
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level.
Robust standard errors corrected for the first stage and clustered by country are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Marginal effects (percentage points)
Private sector Sovereign Public entities
Effects on the probability to issue an investment grade bond
Credit rating residual 0.08*** 1.4*** 0.29***
Foreign debt/GDP 0.57 -14.8 -2.5
Debt service/Exports -9.4*** -39.9 -13.1*
Export growth volatility 5.3 -60.8* -11.3
Short term/Total foreign debt 1.1 -31.0 2.4
Real exchange rate depreciation 0.25*** 0.53 1.0***
Brady–type debt rescheduling -2.0*** -20.0** -5.3***
Non–Brady–type debt rescheduling -1.8*** -18.3* -4.9***
US 10-year Treasury rate -0.44 3.0 1.0*
Log amount -0.63*** -4.7** 0.67
US Dollar denominated 1.7*** -9.0 -3.6
Deutsche Mark/Euro denominated 3.6 -16.7*** -0.21
Yen denominated 6.6 7.0 1.4
Effects on the probability to issue a bank loan
Credit rating residual 0.15** 0.051 -0.050
Foreign debt/GDP 1.1 -0.53 0.43
Debt service/Exports -18*.0** -1.4 2.3
Export growth volatility 10.1** -2.2 2.0
Short term/Total foreign debt 2.2 -1.1 -0.42
Real exchange rate depreciation 0.48*** 0.019 -0.17
Brady–type debt rescheduling -13.8* -9.4 -8.3
Non–Brady–type debt rescheduling -8.3** -6.4 -4.0
US 10-year Treasury rate -0.86* 0.11 -0.18
Log amount -1.2* -0.17 -0.11
US Dollar denominated 4.7* -0.21 1.2
Deutsche Mark/Euro denominated 2.0** -4.7 0.03
Yen denominated 0.11 -0.22 -0.39
Effects on the probability to issue a speculative grade bond
Credit rating residual -0.23*** -1.5*** -0.24***
Foreign debt/GDP -1.7 15.4 2.0
Debt service/Exports 27.4*** 41.4 10.8
Export growth volatility -15.4** 62.9* 9.3*
Short term/Total foreign debt -3.3 32.2 -2.0
Real exchange rate depreciation -0.73*** -0.55 -0.83***
Brady–type debt rescheduling 15.9* 29.4** 13.6
Non–Brady–type debt rescheduling 10.2*** 24.7 8.9**
US 10-year Treasury 1.3* -3.1 -0.85*
Log amount 1.8** 4.8 -0.56
US Dollar denominated -6.3** 9.2 2.4*
Deutsche Mark/Euro denominated -5.6** 21.5* 0.18
Yen denominated -6.7*** -6.7 -0.98
Marginal effects at the mean values of explanatory variables using coefficients in Table 4.
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level.
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residual implies lower risk). The effect is strongly significant and is especially large for the sovereign
borrowers. If credit rating residual increases from -4.7 (average for sovereigns issuing speculative
grade bonds) to 2.5 (average for sovereigns issuing investment grade bonds), the probability of
issuing a speculative grade bond will decrease by about 7.2 percentage points (due to similar
increase in the probability of issuing an investment grade bond), while for private borrowers the
effect is only 0.6 percentage points. Thus, the credit rating residual appears to be more important
when assessing the risk of sovereign debt as compared to private debt. This result is expected: the
residual is based on the sovereign credit rating, which is a better description of the risk associated
with lending to a sovereign than it is of a risk associated with lending to a private company.
The ratio of foreign debt to GDP has the predicted effect in the regressions for sovereign and public
borrowers, although the coefficients are not significantly different from zero.28 The ratio of debt
service to exports, a more short–run measure of indebtedness, has a predicted effect, significant
for private borrowers. It appears that the level of debt does not have an impact on the debt
instrument composition, while potential aggregate liquidity problems, as measured by a high value
of debt service to exports ratio, make borrowers more likely to issue speculative grade bonds rather
than investment grade bonds and bank loans. The effect is rather large: an increase in the ratio
of debt service to exports by one standard deviation (0.2-0.3) raises the probability of issuing a
speculative grade bond by 5.1-5.4 percentage points for private borrowers (mostly due a to decline
in the probability of a loan).
Export volatility has a predicted sign in the regression for sovereign and public borrowers, while
the sign is the opposite in the regression for private borrowers. There is an explanation for this:
higher export volatility increases the probability that the borrower will take out a bank loan rather
28Recently, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) have shown that the effect of foreign debt to GDP ratio on
credit rating is non–linear. Possibly, this explains the lack of significance in the above regression.
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than issue a bond (whether speculative or investment grade). This is confirmed by the analysis of
marginal effects. Possibly, when exports are more volatile, the level of moral hazard is higher, at
least for the borrowers in exporting industries.29 Thus, within the framework of the model, export
volatility does not seem to affect perceived country risk as some previous research suggested (see,
for example, Eichengreen, Hale, and Mody (2001)), that considered the bond market in isolation.
Instead, higher export volatility might lower bond issuance or increase bond spreads due to added
moral hazard and substitution towards bank loans.
Export volatility would not have the same moral hazard effect for sovereign borrowers as it would
have for private borrowers. This is shown clearly in the results — the signs of the coefficients imply
that higher export volatility increases perceived country risk for investors lending to sovereigns and
to public entities. Export volatility might be a much more important variable for those investors
that lend to sovereigns, as it is closely related to the volatility of foreign reserves of the central
bank. An increase by one standard deviation of export volatility (0.1) will increase probability that
a sovereign issues a speculative grade rather than investment grade bond by 6.3 percentage points.
A ratio of short–term to total foreign debt does not seem to have a significant effect on the debt
instrument composition. Alternative specifications, not reported here, included the ratio of foreign
reserves to short–term debt and the ratio of reserves to imports, but none of these variables seem
to matter. Possibly, the ratio of debt service to exports already incorporates investors’ estimate of
liquidity risk. See further discussion of the robustness below.
29If the exporters do not undertake an effort to reduce the risk of their projects, aggregate exports will be more
volatile. In addition, if the exports are volatile for some exogenous reason, exporters will be more inclined to blame
this volatility for their failure and thus less likely to undertake a costly effort to reduce the riskiness of their project.
This, according to Diamond (1991) should result in increased borrowing from banks. Unfortunately, there is no
information on individual firms’ exporting activities to further test this result.
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By construction, an increase in the real exchange rate index implies real depreciation. Thus, we
should expect that the decline in this variable (real appreciation) increases perceived country risk
due to a higher chance of a currency crisis. The results support this prediction in all regressions,
although the effect is not very large in magnitude.
Having a history of debt rescheduling is expected to increase perceived risk. Since some debt
rescheduling arrangements included conversion of debt into guaranteed bonds (Brady–type deals),
they might in addition have increased the probability that (any) bond will be issued by creating or
expanding the secondary market for bonds. Private borrowers from the countries that had Brady–
type arrangements in the previous four quarters never issued investment grade bonds, therefore, for
them the coefficient on Brady–type arrangements is identified by the difference between speculative
grade bonds and bank loans. A Brady–type deal increases the probability that a private borrower
issues a speculative grade bond by 16 percentage points, while a non–Brady–deal increases that
probability by 10 percentage points. In both cases the probability of an investment grade bond
declines by about 2 percentage points and the rest is due to a decline in the probability of a bank
loan. We can see that the probability of a speculative grade bond being issued increases, but we
cannot disentangle whether it is due to higher risk perception or due to an increased liquidity of
the secondary bond market. We might expect that both effects contribute, as the coefficients are
larger in magnitude for Brady–type–rescheduling than they are for non–Brady–type rescheduling.
While the coefficient for the sovereign borrowers is less significant, it is higher in magnitude than the
coefficient for private borrowers. For sovereigns, Brady–type rescheduling increases the probability
of issuing a speculative grade bond by 29 percentage points (20 from investment grade bond and
9 from bank loans), while non–Brady rescheduling increases the probability of a speculative grade
bond by 25 percentage points (18 from investment grade and 7 from loans). Thus, a perceived risk
effect of debt rescheduling is very large and clearly dominant for the sovereigns.
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A higher US Treasury rate is expected to reduce total lending and increase the share of bank
loans. Since those who did not borrow are not in the data set, the first prediction cannot be
addressed directly. However, it should be observationally equivalent to a higher risk level of all
the borrowers and thus, we would expect the coefficient to be positive. This is indeed the case
(borderline significant) for private borrowers, but not for sovereigns and public borrowers. The
prediction of increased share of bank loans overall is borne out by the data, as shown by marginal
effects. However, this effect is not significant and is small in magnitude.
Issue–specific variables are included to control for borrower composition. The coefficients on these
variables seem to have reasonable signs. An increase by one standard deviation in the amount
borrowed increases the probability that a speculative grade bond is issued by about 2 percentage
points. Since bond issues are harder to arrange than bank loans, borrowers that do not need to
borrow as much are more likely to borrow from the bank, other things being equal. The effect of
the amount on the probability of investment grade bond is negligible. If the debt is denominated in
strong currency (Dollar, Mark or Yen — the control group being ‘other’ currency), it is perceived
as less risky, as expected. Private borrowers in all industries other than utilities and infrastructure
(control group) are more likely to issue speculative grade bonds rather than bank loans, while the
industry is not important for public entities.30
Importantly, a binary probit regression of all the bonds combined against the bank loans does not
reveal any significant effects of macroeconomic variables considered.31 This suggests that it is not
appropriate to view investment grade and speculative grade bonds as the same instrument. Since
30Lower perceived risk of the utilities and infrastructure firms is most likely due to the fact that this category
includes, among others, oil companies, refineries and pipelines as well as international freight companies, which are
less subject to country and currency risks.
31The results of binary probit regression are not reported. They are available from author upon request.
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the same variable can increase the probability of issuing a bank loan versus a speculative grade
bond, and increase the probability of issuing an investment grade bond, rather than bank loan, the
effect would be a wash in the regression that pools all the bonds together. This provides a further
confirmation of the validity of the Diamond (1991) model.
4.2 Robustness tests
A number of robustness tests was conducted to make sure the results established in the previous
section are robust. The results of these robustness tests are summarized below, but not reported
— they are available from the author upon request.
First, the model was re-estimated with logistic instead of normal distribution of the errors. This did
not influence the results at all. In addition, binary probit (and logit) regressions were conducted
similar to those in Table 3. For most of the variables the coefficients have signs that are consistent
both with the effects in the ordered probit regressions and with each other, i.e. if an increase in a
given variable increases the probability of obtaining an investment grade bond rather than a bank
loan, it also tends to increase the probability of obtaining a bank loan rather than a speculative grade
bond.32 This explains why in a binary regression that combines investment grade and speculative
grade bonds in one category, the coefficients are not significant.
Another set of tests was conducted within the ordered probit specification by using un-weighed
regressions. Most coefficient (all significant coefficients) remain within the same confidence interval
and retain their significance level. All regressions were initially estimated with credit rating residual
resulting from an OLS weighted regression as described in Appendix 2. The regressions were re–
estimated using residuals from a panel regression estimation and from un-weighed regression. The
32There was one exception: the amount borrowed on the bond market, per issue, tends to be larger than the
amount borrowed from a bank, per loan, regardless of the bond rating.
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results are not sensitive to these changes.
While a lot of debt rescheduling episodes occurred in Latin America, the debt rescheduling variables
do not just proxy for this region. A robustness test was conducted with all the regression re–run with
dummy variables for Latin America and East Asia included — the coefficients on debt rescheduling
do not change by much and become even more significant for all three regressions. Therefore, the
effects of both Brady and non–Brady type arrangements are important above and beyond their
correlation with the regional pattern of the borrowers. The same is true for most other variables
considered — the effects become more significant and some become larger in magnitude when
dummy variables for Latin America and East Asia are included.
In addition, different sets of explanatory variables were considered. In general, variables that tend
to describe similar characteristics of the economy tend to have a similar effect on the perceived
country risk. In particular, higher ratio of reserves to short–term debt and a larger reserve gain
(included one at a time) tend to lower the perceived risk, as expected, but the coefficient is only
significant for the private borrowers or for sovereign borrowers, respectively. A higher growth rate
of domestic credit significantly increases perceived risk for sovereign borrowers, which is expected
— growing domestic credit clearly indicates the government’s problems.33 Variables such as the
rate of real GDP growth, the ratio of reserves to imports, the ratio of current account to GNP
(unless the real exchange rate depreciation is excluded), level of domestic credit, real interest rate,
inflation rate, and the stock of banking system assets as a share of GDP do not have a significant
effect and do not affect other coefficients and the predictive power of the regression.
Finally, additional bond characteristics were included. Including maturity, in logs or levels, as
33The coefficient on this variable for sovereign borrowers debt instrument composition is significant economically
and statistically. It also improves a bit the predictive power of the model for the sovereign. This variable is not
included in the main specification due to missing data, which leads to a reduction in a sample size.
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Table 6: Share of variance in the data explained by ordered regression
Overall Across countries Over time
Private sector 14% 26% 4%
Sovereign 0.2% 0.7% 0.2%
Public enitities 8% 8% 1%
The numbers reported are overall, between and within R2 in the RE regression
of the actual share of bond on predicted share of bonds and a constant term.
The data used are formatted as country–quarter panel.
Fixed effect regressions produce the same set of R2.
Note: The numbers reported are overall, between and within R2 in the random effect regression of the actual share
of bond on predicted share of bonds and a constant term. The data used are formatted as country–quarter panel.
Fixed effect regressions produce the same set of R2.
a control variable, does not affect the results. This is expected since maturity distribution of
bonds and loans is quite similar in the sample. A dummy variable for bonds and loans placed
through off–shore centers was included: its coefficient is positive but not significant and the rest of
the coefficients are not affected. Therefore, it appears that investors are sophisticated enough to
determine true nationality of the borrower even in these cases.
4.3 Predictive power
To see if the ordered probability model has a good predictive power, two variables are constructed:
the share of the number of bond issues (sum of investment and speculative grade bonds) in the total
number of bond and loan issues by quarter and country in the data,34 and the ratio of predicted
probability of a bond issue (either investment grade or speculative grade) to predicted probability
of a bank loan from the estimation, for each quarter and country.
34The ratio constructed with amounts borrowed rather than the number of issues are only slightly different and
the results described below still hold qualitatively.
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Table 6 shows the share of the variance in the data explained by the model. One can see that the
model predictions explain some of the variance over time and across countries for private and, to
a lesser extent, for public borrowers, but not for sovereigns. In all the robustness tests described
above, different sets of explanatory variables explain the maximum of 16% of overall variation in
the share of bonds in total lending for private borrowers, 10% for public entities and 0.8% for the
sovereigns.
There are two possible explanations for the failure of the model for the sovereigns: first, there are
potential endogeneity problems in the estimation and therefore regression coefficients can be biased;
second, it could be that the model is not suitable for explaining the debt instrument composition
for the sovereigns.
In order to further investigate the endogeneity problem that the regression for sovereign borrowers
might exhibit, macroeconomics explanatory variables were lagged by additional one, two and three
quarters. The coefficients remained very close and significance level and predictive power were ac-
tually reduced in the regressions with lagged macro variables. In addition, a two-stage model was
estimated with domestic macroeconomic variables instrumented by CPI, import and export prices,
interest rates, real exchange rates and foreign assets in the US, Germany, France and Japan.35
Predicted values from the first–stage panel regression were then used in the second–stage ordered
probit regression. Most coefficients are unchanged, including the coefficients on currency denomi-
nation of the debt, with the following exceptions: predicted export volatility has a negative effect,
albeit the coefficient is not significant; predicted real exchange rate depreciation is still negative,
35The countries were chosen based on the currency denomination of the majority of bonds and loans for each
country. Variables that were highly correlated across countries were excluded. Predicted values were constructed as
a sum of fixed effects and Xβ. Using random effects instead did not make a difference. Data used were quarterly.
All associated regressions are available from author upon request.
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but is now significant; coefficients on debt rescheduling change significance level. The predictive
power of this model is slightly better, but still quite poor: the model now explains 1% of overall
variance, 3% of cross–country variance and 0.4% of over–time variance.
This additional analysis suggests that while there is some evidence of endogeneity problem, the
model failure to explain debt instrument composition for sovereign borrowers is not merely a result
of misspecification of econometric model. If sovereign borrowers’ main objective is different from
minimizing the cost of borrowing, our model is not a good description of factors determining
sovereign debt composition. In particular, if sovereign borrowers do not choose the lower cost
debt instrument, the relationship between the perceived risk and the instrument debt composition
breaks down, and we would not expect our empirical model to predict well the debt instrument
composition for the foreigners.
It appears that factors other than cost minimization affect whether sovereign borrowers borrow
from the bank or on the bond market. These other considerations are not the focus of this paper.
5 Conclusion
How do macroeconomic fundamentals affect the instrument composition of foreign debt? One
can expect this relationship to be much more pronounced for the EMs because macroeconomic
fundamentals affect the debt instrument composition mainly through the effect of country risk, and
the ratio of country risk to firm idiosyncratic risk is much higher for EM borrowers. This paper
is the first attempt to analyze the relationship between EM debt instruments and macroeconomic
fundamentals empirically. The theoretical corporate finance literature provides the structure for
empirical tests and intuition for interpretation.
Empirical analysis confirms the predictions of Diamond (1991) and allows us to identify funda-
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mentals that do and do not affect country risk and therefore, the composition of debt instruments.
In particular, the analysis confirms that the debt service to exports ratio, the degree of the real
exchange rate appreciation, the volatility of exports, and the history of sovereign debt rescheduling,
among others, affect debt instrument composition in an expected direction and that these effects
are economically important.
The model explains private and public borrowers’ debt composition quite well. However, for sov-
ereign borrowers the model has little if any predictive power. This is not unexpected — sovereign
borrowers are not necessarily minimizing the cost of borrowing, unlike private firms do. This means
that they will not necessarily choose the instrument that offers lowest cost of borrowing, which will
break the model prediction regarding the relationship between risk and debt instrument.
This is, in a sense, good news for economic policy. If the government is trying to affect the debt
instrument that the country primarily relies upon, it can alter its own borrowing. The paper shows
that in addition the government can predict the development of private debt structure as a result
of conducted macroeconomic policies.
Specifically, the analysis reveals that changes in country credit rating and default on sovereign debt
have a large impact on the composition of private borrowers’ external debt. This finding is useful
for two debates that were prominent in recent literature on developing countries foreign debt: on
the role of rating agencies, and on the changes in the sovereign debt restructuring procedures.
Finally, by determining the variables that affect the debt instrument composition, the findings of
this paper facilitate empirical analysis of EM debt and open an avenue for further research on the
relative importance of the bond market and bank financing to developing countries. While there
is a large body of empirical literature on financial contagion, previous studies tend to be limited
to either the bond or the loan markets. More rigorous study would require simultaneous analysis
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of both markets due to the possibility of substitution between the two instruments (as the effects
of export volatility illustrate). This paper therefore can help researchers resolve the question of
whether international bonds are safer than international bank loans in times of financial instability.
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Appendix 1. Debt instrument composition and debt restructuring
The length of debt restructuring was measured by combining official dates of debt restructuring
agreements (IMF and WB publications) with news reports about the on–set of debt restructuring
negotiations, found using Lexis–Nexis Academic Universe database. The difference between these
dates, in months, measure the amount of time it took to reach an agreement. The frequency of
restructuring episodes is equal to the number of restructuring episodes in a group of countries
considered over total number of country-quarters in that group.
These data were combined with the share of bond debt in the total stock of foreign debt of a
country, using Joint BIS–IMF–OECD–World Bank Statistics on External Debt. The Table on the
next page lists all the countries which had some form of debt negotiations in the 1990s and for
which debt stock data were available.
If we split these episodes of debt restructuring by the quartiles of bond share in the total stock of
foreign debt, we find the following:
Quartile Bond share Length of negotiations (months) Freq.(restruct.)
average median percent
1st 0 10.6 9 0.85
2nd (0,0.03] 10.8 10 0.92
3rd (0.03, 0.19] 7.4 6 0.74
4th > 0.19 18.1 18 0.61
While there is no clear difference between the amount of time it takes to reach an agreement for the
first three quartiles of bond share distribution, it is very clear that if the bond share is high (exceeds
20%), the negotiations take about twice as long. On the other hand, negotiations seems to happen
more frequently in the countries and quarters with lower share of bond debt, which is indicated
by the numbers in the last column of the table above and the negative (albeit not significant)
coefficient of -0.32 (standard error of 0.34) in a probit regression with restructuring indicator on
the left-hand side and the share of bonds in this quarter and this country and a constant term as
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Country Negotiations Stock of debt (mil. USD)
began (y, m) lasted (m) bond loan bond share
Algeria 1993 12 6 516 14286 0.035
Bolivia 1993 4 11 10 311 0.031
1997 4 18 3 520 0.0057
2000 2 19 0 1002 0
Brazil 1993 1 15 7815 67923 0.10
Bulgaria 1993 6 10 181 7099 0.025
Dominican Republic 1993 11 9 0 607 0
Ecuador 1992 9 10 15 3221 0.0046
1999 4 17 6444 3017 0.68
Egypt 1991 3 2 0 5611 0
Ethiopia 1992 5 7 0 290 0
2000 9 7 0 43 0
Indonesia 1997 10 8 6384 62248 0.093
Jamaica 1992 4 9 0 437 0
Korea 1997 8 5 49412 99462 0.33
Mexico 1994 12 18 52253 64628 0.45
Nigeria 1998 9 27 2051 1660 0.55
Pakistan 1998 8 5 969 7429 0.12
2000 11 2 314 6078 0.049
2001 10 2 19 5037 0.0038
Peru 1995 5 14 80 4610 0.017
Philippines 1990 7 11 0 9616 0
Poland 1993 1 21 0 12810 0
Russia 1998 8 3 18627 52786 0.26
South Africa 1993 4 5 1216 12561 0.088
Turkey 1998 7 35 13986 33332 0.30
Ukraine 1999 5 22 1044 1342 0.44
the only explanatory variables.
Although these results do not represent careful analysis of the effect of debt instrument composition
on the frequency and length of debt rescheduling (this analysis is a subject of ongoing research),
they are indicative of the importance of debt composition.
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Appendix 2. Credit rating residual
The credit ratings of sovereigns tend to be constructed by the rating agencies as a function of
macroeconomic variables. Variables that are commonly used include the growth rate of real GDP
(a higher growth rate should improve the credit rating), the ratio of total debt service to exports (a
lower ratio should improve the credit rating), the ratio of total external debt to GNP (a lower ratio
should improve the credit rating), the variance of export growth (a lower variance should improve
the credit rating), and the inflation rate (a lower inflation rate should improve the credit rating).
Debt rescheduling typically worsens a country’s credit rating.
Coef. S.E.
Foreign debt/GDP -6.38*** 1.28
Debt service/Exports -19.3*** 1.59
Export growth volatility -36.2*** 2.99
Log of inflation rate -2.56*** 0.24
Short term/Total foreign debt 16.6*** 1.61
Real exchange rate depreciation -0.0069 0.14
Foreign reserves/Imports 1.58*** 0.20
Growth rate of real GDP 176.1*** 23.9
Brady type debt rescheduling -11.7*** 1.67




Note: *** = significant at 1% level.
The estimates in the table are from an OLS estimation. The weights are assigned to each observation
in such a way that each country in each quarter has the same weight, provided that the country
borrowed in the international market in a given quarter.36 The dependent variable is the credit
rating assigned to a country by Institutional Investor (0-100 scale) twice a year. Macroeconomic
variables are quarterly. All the variables have predicted signs and are strongly significant. The
credit rating residual is then a simple residual from this regression.
36The same regression without weights leads to a predicted credit rating residual that is highly correlated (corre-
lation coefficient is equal 0.97) with the one predicted by the weighted regression.
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Appendix 3.
Bond classification into investment and speculative grade
Unfortunately, individual bond ratings are available for only a small subset of the bonds. Moody’s
individual bond ratings are available for only 1951 out of 3757 bond issues.37 In most cases, the
S&P and Moody’s rating, when both available, either both assign an investment grade, or both
assign a speculative grade to the borrower.38 There are 139 issues for which issuers are rated by
S&P, which provides information for additional 21 bond issues (as 118 issues overlap with those for
which ratings are available). Thus, based on available ratings, we can classify 1972 bonds, out of
which 819 are investment and 1153 are speculative grade.
Next, sovereign bonds can be classified using sovereign credit ratings. Since Institutional Investor’s
credit rating does not provide a clear split between investment and speculative grade, and Moody’s
refused to provide historical data, S&P ratings that are available on the Internet are utilized.
Unfortunately, this data is overlapping with existing classification and thus, does not allow us to
classify any of the additional bonds.39
37The individual bond ratings from Moody’s are available for 1945 bonds; additional 6 bonds are classified based
on Moody’s issuer rating that is available for 256 bond issues with 250 bonds for which individual ratings are also
available. Except for 11 issues, whenever a bond is assigned an investment grade, the issuer is also assigned an
investment grade and vice versa. For 11 issues, the issue is rated “Baa3” while the issuer has a one-notch-lower
rating — “Ba1”. The boundary between investment grade and speculative bonds lies just between those two grades.
I classify those 11 issues as non-investment grade, due to the fact that, when the S&P rating for the same issuers is
available, it is a non-investment rating.
38There are 13 bonds for which S&P assigned non-investment grade while Moody’s assigned investment grade and
5 bonds for which Moody’s assigned non-investment grade and S&P assigned investment grade. I rank those bonds
according to Moody’s as individual bond ratings are more precise than issuer’s ratings.
39There are 195 sovereign bonds for which S&P sovereign ratings do not agree with the classification described
above. Since sovereign ratings are somewhat imprecise (by construction of my data set they are only changed
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There are two ways to classify the rest of the bonds. First, would be to use the so-called “sovereign
ceiling” practice, when rating agencies do not assign private ratings that exceed the rating of their
sovereign. Assuming that no borrowers in a country could issue an investment grade bond if their
sovereign is assigned a non-investment rating, additional 518 bonds that were not classified before
can be classified as speculative grade.40 The sovereign ceiling does not allow us to classify any bonds
as investment grade. Now 2490 bonds are classified: 819 are investment and 1671 are speculative
grade.
This information can be extrapolated in order to determine for the majority of still unclassified
bonds if they are investment or speculative grade bonds. First, a binary variable that takes up a
value of 1 if the assigned rating is investment grade and 0 otherwise is constructed.41 We then fit a
probit model using available data on issuers. The results reported in Table 7 are used to predict the
probability that the bond is investment grade. A bond is classified as investment grade bond if the
predicted probability for this bond is more than 0.5, otherwise a bond is classified as speculative.42
For 1644 bonds that are already classified this procedure provides correct classification, while 364
bonds are misclassified. Given that in 82% of the cases this procedure gives the right answer, it
seems to be useful for classifying the remaining bonds. This procedure allows to classify additional
214 bonds as investment grade and additional 374 bonds as speculative grade — for a total of 3078
bond issues classified.
quarterly), I stick to the previous classification. For 363 sovereign bonds, both measures lead to the same results.
40I choose not to impose the sovereign ceiling when individual ratings are available. As S&P claim, they are “less
likely than other agencies to use sovereign ceiling”.
41To make this as clean as possible, I only use the individual Moody’s bond ratings that are available for 1951
bonds.
42For sensitivity tests we also estimate separate probit regressions for each ownership sector and construct separate
predictions for each ownership sector. The results are presented in Table 7.
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Table 7: Probit regression used to classify bonds
All Private Public Sovereign
Credit rating 0.019*** 0.010* 0.033*** 0.065***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Spread -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Guarantee 0.27** 0.15 0.54** -0.43
(0.13) (0.18) (0.24) (0.44)
UK governing law -0.49*** -0.82*** -0.74*** -0.35
(0.091) (0.31) (0.19) (0.22)
US governing law -0.096 -0.35 -0.47 -0.13
(0.14) (0.28) (0.32) (0.23)
Issue in DM 0.12 0.56 1.16*** -0.60**
(0.16) (0.38) (0.35) (0.26)
Issue in Euro 0.21 1.097*** 0.34 -0.45*
(0.17) (0.41) (0.57) (0.24)
Issue in Yen 0.37*** 0.13 0.50** 0.012
(0.14) (0.35) (0.23) (0.23)














Constant 1.11*** 0.63 -1.50*** -1.62***
(0.41) (0.55) (0.58) (0.53)
Observations 1612 650 395 546
Log likelihood -752.1 -254.3 -183.1 -262.2
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.28
Binary dependant variable =0 for speculative grade bond, =1 for investment grade bond.
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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The other 679 bond issues are missing explanatory variables, predominantly spread. For now, they









A categorical variable is then created. It is equal to 0 if an investment grade bond is observed, to
1 if a loan is observed, to 2 if a speculative grade bond is observed, and is missing for the bonds
that are not classified. Further, we test whether the above classification of bonds is appropriate.
According to the model, there are basically two group of borrowers: some can choose between
investment grade bonds and bank loans, while others can choose between speculative grade bonds
and bank loans. Adding a third choice to each of the groups should not affect the decision, as
shown in Figure 2. Thus, if classification is appropriate, we should expect that in multinomial logit
estimation assumption of independence from irrelevant alternative (IIA) holds when a second type
of bonds is excluded. If loan alternative is removed, however, IIA should fail strongly, as investors
do not choose between speculative and investment grade bonds. If the bonds are misclassified,
there is no reason why IIA should hold.
Omitted χ2 D.of F. Prob(. > χ2) Evidence
Small–Hsiao (LR) tests of IIA assumption
I.G. bond 13.3 14 0.51 for Ho
S.G. bond 14.8 14 0.39 for Ho
loan 56.5 14 0.00 against Ho
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The results of Small–Hsiao LLR test to test for IIA are reported in the Table above. They strongly
suggest that the classification is appropriate: excluding either investment or speculative grade
bonds does not change the results, while excluding loans does change them. These results also hold
for alternative definitions as mentioned above.
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Data Appendix
The data were collected from the data sources and in the formats described below.
Variable Source Units Frequency
US treasury rate Federal Reserve annual % daily
Credit rating Institutional Investor 0–100 scale bi-annual
Debt service IMF IFS US$ quarterly
Exports, imports and CA IMF IFS US$ quarterly, monthly
Real and nom. GDP IMF IFS index and n.c. quarterly
C.B.Reserves IMF IFS US$ quarterly
Domestic credit IMF IFS US$ quarterly
Short–term I.R. IMF IFS annual % quarterly
CPI IMF IFS index quarterly
Exchange rate IMF IFS n.c./dollar quarterly
Inflation rate IMF IFS US$ quarterly
Banking system assets IMF IFS US$ quarterly
External debt (total and sh.t.) BIS US$ bi-annual
Debt rescheduled WB GDF publications list by date of restruct.
Bond data Bondware by closing date
Loan data Loanware by signing date
Table 11 lists the countries in the data set and the number of observations, as well as the number
and amount of bonds and loans for each country. A share of investment grade bonds (relative to the
total number of bonds) is derived from the artificial classification of bonds that is not in the original
data set. See Appendix 3. Algeria, Barbados, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia,
Mauritius, Moldova, Oman, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Seyshelles, Taiwan, United
Arab Emirates, and Vietnam also borrowed internationally but are not included in the regression
analysis due to missing explanatory variables.
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Table 8: Amount (bln. USD) of bonds and loans by country and ownership sector
Country Private firms Sovereign Public entities
Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans
Algeria* 0 0.19 0 0 0 19.9
Angola 0 0.14 0 0 0 6.34
Argentina 21.4 35.8 52.6 4.06 4.52 9.98
Bahrain 0 1.07 0 0.5 0 7.55
Bangladesh 0 6.59 0 0 0 0.3
Barbados* 0 0.062 0.13 0.036 0 0
Bolivia 0.03 0.71.0 0 0 0 0.1
Brazil 29.36 29.9 15.18 0.076 12.09 14.57
Bulgaria 0.05 0.039 0 0 0.16 0.65
Chile 4.62 22.86 0.5 0.036 0.1 6.05
China 2.77 12.3 5.78 0.58 12.7 63.99
Colombia 1.52 12.09 6.30 2.87 1.30 2.43
Costa Rica 0 0.17 1.5 0 0.15 0
Croatia 0.033 1.56 1.19 0.77 0.14 1.18
Czech Republic 4.83 3.72 0.69 0 3.36 9.48
Dominican Republic 0.6 0.19 0 0 0.12 0
Ecuador 0.61 0.11 0.5 0.088 0.13 0.44
Egypt 0.1 4.40 0 0.049 0 2.27
El Salvador 0 0.80 0.45 0.042 0 0.41
Estonia 0.44 0.41 0.48 0.15 0.084 0.48
Ethiopia* 0 0 0 0 0 0.11
Ghana* 0.25 0.92 0 0.36 0 3.21
Guatemala 0.18 0.60 0.45 0 0 0.11
Hong Kong 33.34 89.71 0 0 5.34 11.19
Hungary 0.27 4.96 18.36 0.48 0.41 6.96
India 3.83 10.70 0 0.21 2.05 18.71
Indonesia 16.50 51.0 0.4 6.45 1.28 8.44
Iran* 0 4.03 0 0.045 0 10.74
Jamaica* 0.24 0.84 0.95 0.36 0 0
Kazakhstan 0.20 0.51 1.25 1.72 0 0.80
Kenya 0 0.11 0 0 0 0.055
Korea 30.23 39.67 4.00 2.42 35.21 13.65
Kuwait 0 0.69 0 13.42 0 7.82
Latvia 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.20 0 0.40
Lebanon 0.89 1.08 7.49 0.30 0.73 0.01
Lesotho* 0 0 0 0.018 0 0.60
Liberia* 0.51 3.10 0 0 0 0.12
Lithuania 0 0.43 0.96 0.76 0 0.49
* = country was not include in estimation due to missing macroeconomic variables.
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Bond and loan data are summarized in Table 10. Note that East Asian borrowers rely mostly on
bank loans, while Latin American borrowers rely primarily on bonds. This is consistent with the
model’s predictions — East Asian borrowers were viewed by investors as relatively low–risk before
the Asian crisis.
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Table 9: Amount (bln. USD) of bonds and loans by country and ownership sector (cont.)
Country Private firms Sovereign Public entities
Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans
Malaysia 5.41 33.55 1.19 2.62 7.52 15.15
Mauritius* 0 0.094 0.45 0.064 0 0.40
Mexico 34.62 39.34 31.68 5.84 17.38 35.95
Moldova* 0 0.087 0.29 0 0 0
Morocco 0.30 2.57 1.02 0.58 0 1.56
Nigeria 0 0.68 0 0 0 0.24
Oman* 0 0.79 0.68 3.16 0 4.42
Pakistan 0.045 3.95 0.75 1.80 0.10 7.50
Panama* 0.23 2.27 2.50 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 0 0.53 0 0.28 0 2.58
Paraguay 0 0.10 0 0.19 0 0
Peru 0.50 6.34 0 0.60 0 0.91
Philippines 7.20 9.73 7.56 9.54 1.92 6.62
Poland 4.87 5.63 0.81 0.30 0.19 5.07
Qatar* 0 2.61 0 5.91 0 14.21
Romania* 0.075 1.81 0.35 0.091 0 3.40
Russia 3.27 6.92 17.0 0.045 1.50 33.25
Saudi Arabia* 0 10.93 0.28 19.33 0 23.24
Seychelles* 0 0.019 0 0.0072 0 0
Singapore 5.56 25.68 0 0 2.63 1.92
Slovak Republic 0.31 9.63 2.38 0.12 0.38 4.00
Slovenia 0 1.086 2.43 1.05 0 0.57
South Africa 2.37 13.71 4.67 0 7.50 4.44
Sri Lanka 0 0.65 0.15 0.20 0.23 1.06
Taiwan* 8.67 36.35 0 0 0.76 1.44
Thailand 11.79 41.74 2.28 0.45 1.93 11.57
Trinidad and Tobago 0.33 3.26 2.04 0.15 0 0.15
Tunisia 0 0.68 2.81 1.22 0 1.18
Turkey 2.09 23.10 23.33 7.64 1.65 10.31
Ukraine 0 0.089 3.44 0 0 0.35
United Arab Emirates* 0 1.50 0 0.026 0 3.65
Uruguay 0.95 0.57 3.23 0.14 0 0.026
Venezuela 5.96 7.98 10.45 1.52 3.16 7.41
Vietnam* 0 0.75 0 0.079 0 2.26
Zambia 0 0.040 0 0 0 1.48
Zimbabwe 0 0.75 0 0.13 0 1.027
* = country was not include in estimation due to missing macroeconomic variables.
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Table 10: Distribution of bonds (first line) and loans (second line) by region for each year
Region 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1991-9
By the amount issued:
E. Europe 15% 7% 10% 6% 9% 6% 10% 26% 14% 12%
and C.Asia 10% 5% 7% 9% 8% 8% 12% 9% 7% 9%
Middle East 4% 15% 7% 5% 7% 5% 5% 8% 10% 7%
29% 26% 15% 18% 16% 9% 13% 16% 20% 17%
E. Asia and 34% 29% 35% 52% 42% 41% 34% 16% 29% 34%
Pacific 32% 40% 52% 55% 47% 52% 43% 30% 32% 43%
Caribbean 0% 1.4% 0.7% 1.3% 0% 0.5% 0.6% 1.4% 0.5% 0.7%
0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 1.2% 0% 0.5% 0.4%
Latin America 43% 44% 46% 31% 36% 46% 44% 47% 44% 43%
18% 17% 17% 11% 15% 21% 24% 37% 32% 22%
South Asia 1.7% 0% 1.0% 2.0% 1.4% 1.3% 2.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.2%
2.6% 3.3% 4.3% 4.7% 4.4% 4.8% 3.9% 3.8% 3.4% 4.0%
Africa 2.4% 3.8% 0.9% 3.5% 3.1% 1.2% 4.4% 1.7% 2.2% 2.6%
8.1% 7.8% 4.0% 2.3% 9.9% 4.1% 2.8% 3.6% 5.7% 5.1%
Total 13.1 21.1 57.5 55.3 58.1 106.5 136.2 80.0 87.6 615.4
(bln U.S.$) 87.5 74.8 83.2 104.4 150.7 161.8 234.7 130.4 120.2 1147.7
By the number of issues:
E. Europe 11% 7% 6% 6% 11% 7% 12% 20% 15% 10%
and C.Asia 5% 6% 8% 9% 9% 9% 13% 17% 14% 10%
Middle East 2.4% 7% 3% 1.9% 4% 4% 5% 9% 8% 5%
12% 14% 12% 8% 6% 6% 8% 12% 14% 9%
E. Asia and 45% 29% 35% 52% 53% 50% 42% 16% 39% 42%
Pacific 55% 52% 53% 60% 60% 63% 52% 36% 37% 53%
Caribbean 0% 1.5% 0.7% 2.1% 0% 0.9% 1.0% 2.1% 0.5% 1.0%
1.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.8% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 0% 0.4% 0.5%
Latin America 39% 53% 53% 34% 27% 35% 36% 50% 36% 38%
15% 18% 16% 11% 13% 12% 17% 26% 26% 17%
South Asia 0.8% 0% 1.4% 2.2% 2.0% 2.3% 3.1% 1.0% 0.2% 1.8%
3.4% 3.2% 4.3% 7.1% 5.8% 6.7% 6.3% 4.9% 2.9% 5.3%
Africa 2.4% 3.0% 0.7% 1.5% 2.2% 0.9% 1.2% 1.7% 1.4% 1.4%
8% 6% 6% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 5% 5%
Total 127 203 434 481 454 690 669 289 427 3774
924 1045 1160 1371 1790 1979 2182 1172 1070 12693
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Table 11: Amount (bln. USD) and number of bonds and loans by country
Country N. bonds N. loans Am. bonds Am. loans % IG in N. % IG in Am.
Algeria* 0 76 0 20.1 0 0
Angola 0 33 0 6.5 0 0
Argentina 379 401 78.4 49.8 0 0
Bahrain 13 77 0 9.1 8% 0
Bangladesh 0 12 0 0.9 0 0
Barbados* 5 7 0.13 0.10 100% 100%
Bolivia 3 21 0.03 0.81 0 0
Brazil 431 336 56.6 44.5 0 0
Bulgaria 4 15 0.2 0.7 0 0
Chile 44 337 5.2 51.6 68% 81%
China 122 1324 21.2 78.5 66% 76%
Colombia 41 159 9.1 17.4 27% 18%
Costa Rica 9 13 1.6 0.2 0 0
Croatia 11 68 1.4 3.5 82% 93%
Czech Rep. 173 141 8.9 13.2 20% 61%
Dominican Rep. 6 6 0.7 0.2 50% 14%
Ecuador 11 22 1.2 0.6 0 0
Egypt 1 59 0.1 6.7 0 0
El Salvador 3 41 0.4 1.2 100% 100%
Estonia 24 148 1.0 3.5 54% 80%
Ethiopia* 0 3 0 0.1 0 0
Ghana* 1 72 0.3 4.5 0 0
Guatemala 6 15 0.6 0.7 0 0
Hong Kong 563 881 96.2 100.1 56% 63%
Hungary 77 184 19.0 12.4 97% 99%
India 53 420 5.9 29.7 0 0
Indonesia 130 1069 18.1 65.9 4% 2%
Iran* 0 47 0 14.8 0 0
Jamaica* 9 24 1.2 1.2 0 0
Kazakhstan 9 47 1.4 3.0 0 0
Kenya 0 9 0 0.2 0 0
Korea 584 1015 69.5 55.7 46% 72%
Kuwait 0 89 0 22.6 0 0
Latvia 7 29 0.4 0.7 100% 100%
Lebanon 42 30 9.1 1.3 0 0
Lesotho* 0 17 0 0.6 0 0
Liberia* 3 162 0.5 14.3 0 0
Lithuania 10 54 1.0 1.7 0 0
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Table 12: Amount (bln. USD) and number of bonds and loans by country (cont.)
Country N. bonds N. loans Am. bonds Am. loans % IG in N. % IG in Am.
Malaysia 62 583 14.1 51.5 65% 82%
Mauritius* 3 21 0.5 0.5 100% 100%
Mexico 345 538 83.7 81.1 42% 64%
Moldova* 5 7 0.3 0.08 0 0
Morocco 7 62 1.3 4.7 0 0
Nigeria 0 25 0 0.9 0 0
Oman* 3 103 0.7 124.4 100% 100%
Pakistan 6 212 0.9 13.2 0 0
Panama* 37 43 2.7 2.3 24% 93%
Papua New Guinea 0 33 0 3.4 0 0
Paraguay 0 9 0 0.3 0 0
Peru 9 101 0.5 7.9 0 0
Philippines 112 242 17.9 19.8 0 0
Poland 28 170 5.9 11.0 39% 44%
Qatar* 2 53 0 22.7 0 0
Romania* 2 85 0.4 5.3 0 0
Russia 45 319 21.8 43.4 0 0
Saudi Arabia* 1 119 0.3 53.5 100% 100%
Seychelles* 0 6 0 0.03 0 0
Singapore 56 324 8.2 27.6 25% 23%
Slovak Rep. 24 110 3.1 5.5 0 0
Slovenia 6 132 2.4 6.3 100% 100%
South Africa 47 163 14.5 18.1 68% 83%
Sri Lanka 9 30 0.4 1.9 0 0
Taiwan* 100 411 9.4 37.8 12% 15%
Thailand 150 916 16.0 53.8 21% 25%
Trinidad & Tobago 17 25 2.4 3.6 71% 67%
Tunisia 15 58 2.8 3.1 100% 100%
Turkey 99 552 27.1 41.1 0 0
Ukraine 10 18 34.4 0.4 0 0
UAE* 0 88 0 8.9 0 0
Uruguay 37 22 4.2 0.7 89% 93%
Venezuela 134 183 30.3 18.7 28% 27%
Vietnam* 0 80 0 30.8 0 0
Zambia 0 76 0 4.5 0 0
Zimbabwe 0 59 0 1.9 0 0
* = country was not include in estimation due to missing macroeconomic variables.
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